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Group Billing In College Residence Halls:
Is It Defensible?
I. Introduction
Education, in its broadest sense, is the transmission of social
life;' society can continue to exist only if community goals, norms
and knowledge are transmitted to each generation.2 College resi-
dence halls, as microcosms of society, make valuable contributions to
this transmission process.
Rules and regulations are necessary for the maintenance of any
community, and an appropriate community response to the inevita-
ble violations is equally indispensable. In college residence hall com-
munities, the most frequent violation is in the form of vandalism.
Concerned housing administrators have employed various methods$
to counteract such behavior, and from among the alternatives, collec-
tive or group billing4 has emerged as the prevalent remedy 5 because
it allows administrators to recoup the financial loss of vandalism
without regard for individual culpability. Thus, when damages occur
and the persons responsible cannot be identified, a group of students
are collectively held liable.
While group billing evokes strong and often polar responses on
campus," it has received scant attention outside of the campus com-
munity.7 This comment will explore the practical and theoretical jus-
tifications for group billing, anticipate sources of legal challenges to
the practice, predict judicial responses to these challenges, and pro-
1. J. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 5 (1916).
2. D. DECOSTER & P. MABLE, STUDENT DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION IN COLLEGE
RESIDENCE HALLS 21 (1974).
3. One novel approach offers rewards for information leading to the arrest and convic-
tion of or disciplinary action against individuals found to be responsible for vandalism. An-
other relocates groups of students from particular floors which have repeated vandalism.
4. See infra notes 78-90 and accompanying text for a more detailed description of group
billing.
5. An informal survey by the author of thirty colleges and universities in Pennsylvania
revealed that twenty of the institutions practice group billing.
6. Students in general oppose group billing. While some administrators agree, most find
it a useful practice. A few institutions reported that concerns about the legality of group bill-
ing inhibited its implementation on their campuses.
7. Given the increased litigiousness of today's student, the practice will probably not
remain unchallenged. Hopefully, institutions will review their own policies before judicial deci-
sions compel an external review.
pose recommendations for student personnel practitioners and uni-
versity counsel.
II. The Relationship Between Students and Higher Educational
Institutions
A. The Nature of the Relationship
Academe is steeped in tradition. Such reverence for historical
customs profoundly influences common perceptions of higher educa-
tion's role in society. The university8 has always been regarded as a
close-knit, self-governing unit that has promulgated and applied its
own rules.9 Thus, despite many changes in the status relationship 0
between students and the institution, the companion legal relation-
ship has not enjoyed a corresponding evolution." This disparity does
not stem from want of discontent. Throughout the history of higher
education, students have sought a more equitable balance between
institutional autonomy and accountability. Regretfully, students
have often resorted to misconduct as a vehicle for their protests.' 2
Today, malcontents are channeling their complaints to the
courts more and more frequently. Students, however, are rarely vic-
torious in their claims against the school.' 3 Although the institution's
dominance over the student has waned, colleges and universities still
enjoy wide latitude in formulating and implementing rules and regu-
lations.' This tradition of freedom from judicial intervention which
8. The terms "college" and "university" are used interchangeably throughout this
comment.
9. Miller v. Long Island Univ., 85 Misc. 2d 393, 398, 380 N.Y.S.2d 917, 922 (Sup. Ct.
1976).
10. "Status" connotes the position or social relationship of the individual in or with re-
gard to the rest of the community. In re Adoption of Doe, 231 N.C. 1, 3, 56 S.E.2d 8, 12
(1949).
11. See supra notes 13-29 and accompanying text.
12. The veritable straight jacket of rules regulating student conduct in the colonial pe-
riod of higher education (1630-1780) precipitated severe misconduct during the federal (1780-
1812) and expansion periods (1812-1862). Describing a not atypical mid-nineteenth century
riot, one historian notes: "Then all hell broke loose!... Furniture and glass in the recitation
rooms of the University were smashed, and the fragments hurled out of the windows . . . a
terrific explosion took place in the chapel .... MORISON, THREE CENTURIES OF HARVARD,
1636-1936, 252-3 (1936), quoted in H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN, HIGHER EDUCATION & THE
LAW 349 (1979).
13. Students achieve the least success when challenging an academic decision of the
institution. Courts perceive their power of review in academic areas very narrowly as compared
to review of disciplinary matters. Compare Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448, 449 (5th
Cir. 1976) (sustaining university's decision not to grant a master's degree and refusing to
intrude into matters of traditional educational decisionmaking beyond the scope of judicial
review), with Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060 (N.D. Ga. 1977), affd mem., 579
F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1978) (traditional rule of nonintervention in academic matters does not
apply to review of disciplinary actions).
14. Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir. 1969)
(flexibility accorded colleges establishing standards of conduct for students).
accounts for the meager success of student-initiated suits is known as
the doctrine of academic abstention."5
B. Academic Abstention
Academic abstentionism accords educational institutions a great
deal of autonomy in governing internal affairs. The foundation for
academic abstention was laid in the twelfth century when the power
of the university paralleled other influential social institutions. 6 Ju-
dicial and legislative deference continued to flourish until quite re-
cently.1 7 The doctrine found nourishment in sentiment,' 8 in princi-
ples of academic freedom,' 9 and in the mystique of higher
education.20
The inherent tension between institutional autonomy and judi-
cial review of academic decisionmaking lent further support to a
noninterventionist stance. Many educators and jurists presumed that
judicial intervention would frustrate the institution's goals and lead
to its inevitable demise .2  Recently, however, courts have displayed
an increased willingness to entertain student grievances in recogni-
tion of the erosion of the doctrinal underpinnings of the academic
abstention doctrine.
Increased awareness of the economic significance of a college
15. Academic abstention is reflected in the following passage:
Education is the living and growing source of our progressive civilization, of our
open repository of increasing knowledge, culture and our salutory democratic
traditions. As such, education deserves the highest respect and fullest protection
of the courts in the performance of its lawful missions. . . . If it is true, as it
well may be, that man is in a race between education and catastrophe, it is
imperative that educational institutions not be limited in the performance of its
[sic] lawful missions by unwarranted judicial interference.
General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Student Discipline in Tax
Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133, 136, 141 (1968).
16. In later periods, the educational institutions were unable to maintain their indepen-
dence but the ideal has persisted. T. Ross. THE UNIVERSITY: THE ANATOMY OF ACADEME 4
(1976).
17. Perkins, Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045,
1148-52 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Perkins, Developments].
18. The widely held paradigm of the immature student and the responsible institution
supports judicial nonintervention in the affairs of academe. Id. at 1149.
19. Academic freedom denotes the protection afforded the scholarly community from
administrative, political or ecclesiastical constraints. Id. at 1048.
20. Higher education is viewed as a unique enterprise with a special mission. Faculty are
thought to possess special knowledge and sensitivity which enables them to maintain the deli-
cate and complex institution. Lacking similar expertise, courts hesitate to intervene in institu-
tional decisionmaking. W. KAPLIN, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 4 (1978).
21. The view that judicial intervention would tumble the institutional array was ex-
pressed by the court in Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609, 615 (D.D.C. 1967):
It would be a sad blow to institutions of higher learning and to the development
of independent thought and culture if the courts were to step in and control and
direct the administration of discipline . . . in universities and colleges. An enter-
ing wedge seemingly innocuous at first blush, may lead step-by-step to a serious
external domination of universities and colleges and a consequent damper and
hindrance to their intellectual development and growth.
degree is a major impetus in the doctrine's decline.2 The death knell
of the characterization of education as a privilege"3 has been a cor-
relative stimulus. Other devitalizing factors include the changing
composition of the student body,24 student unrest in the 1960's,15 so-
ciety's increased litigiousness, student consumerism, 2' greater gov-
ernment involvement in higher education, and the altered nature of
the institution itself.
27
Colleges and universities still have a legitimate interest in being
free of unwarranted restraints on their ability to shape policies and
pursue their mission. The concept of academic freedom necessarily
embraces all members of the educational community, including stu-
dents.28 Ironically, however, academic freedom has shielded institu-
tional subjugation of students' rights from scrutiny.2 9 It is this incon-
gruity that impels a more careful scrutiny of institutional
decisionmaking.
While academic abstention is far from dead, the doctrine no
longer commands the support it once enjoyed. Pressure for increased
judicial intervention has resulted in a more receptive judiciary. The
22. The economic value of a college degree, both to the student and to the national
economy, has been firmly established. E. HARTFORD, EDUCATION IN THESE UNITED STATES
114-21 (1964).
23. The concept of education as a privilege was once a widely held assumption. See, e.g.,
Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) ("privilege" of attending col-
lege is not within the ambit of the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, thus requiring all male students to enroll in military science and training courses is
permissible). It was not until 1961 that the right-privilege distinction was rejected. See Dixon
v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 156-7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930
(1961) (recognizing that the rudiments of fair play and due process required notice and some
opportunity to be heard before students at state colleges could be expelled for misconduct).
24. As the average age of college students increases, students may be less tolerant of
institutional paternalism, and more conscious of their rights.
25. Historically, maintaining the isolation of the academic community was a means of
protecting fractious students from civil or criminal sanctions. The university established exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the student, who in turn, was compelled to rely on the institution. In the
wake of student unrest in the 1960's this isolation was irrevocably shattered. Once administra-
tions turned to external authorities to quell the riots and prosecuted students, it was not sur-
prising that the students returned to the courts for vindication of their rights. See H. ED-
WARDS & V. NORDIN, HIGHER EDUCATION & THE LAW, 349-50 (1979) .
26. The concept of student consumerism calls for adherence to a higher standard of
expectations for institutional behavior. The push for institutional accountability stems from the
increasing costs of higher education, the demise of the doctrine of in loco parentis, see infra,
note 34 and accompanying text, and the post-Watergate mentality. See EI-Khawas, Putting
the Student Consumer Issue in Perspective, 58 EDUCATIONAL RECORD 169 (1977); El-
Khawas, Consumerism as an Emerging Issue for Postsecondary Education, 56 EDUCATIONAL
RECORD 126 (1975).
27. Educational institutions have increased in size and scope. With this expansion, the
complexity of the bureaucratic machinery has similarly swelled. The notion of a close-knit
academic community is no longer applicable to the modern college. Today, almost all univer-
sity functions outside the classroom are performed by professionally trained and specialized
administrators.
28. Perkins, Developments, supra note 17, at 1148.
29. One commentator posits that the overextension of academic freedom to administra-
tive matters undermines the doctrine generally. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Aca-
demic Freedom in the General Issue of Civil Liberties, 140 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 404 (1973).
courts have, however, struggled to articulate a coherent legal theory
descriptive of the student-institution relationship. While no one the-
ory has garnered universal support,30 the few which have emerged
provide insights into the sources and limits of institutional authority.
Historically, the three most widely cited theories are in loco paren-
tis,81 and contract 2 and constitutional law.33
C. In Loco Parentiss4 Theory
The predominant theory prior to 1961 s" which a court often in-
voked as a justification for their hands-off policy was in loco paren-
tis. The theory crystallized in Gott v. Berea College:36
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physi-
cal and moral welfare and mental training of their pupils, and
we are unable to see why, to that end, they may not make any
rule or regulation for the government or betterment of their
pupils that a parent could for the same purpose. Whether rules
or regulations are wise or their aims worthy is a matter left
solely to the discretion of the authorities . . . the courts are not
disposed to interfere, unless the rules are unlawful or against
public policy."7
Although, remnants of paternalism can still be found today in
certain aspects of educational administration," in the face of the
changing nature of higher education, 9 in loco parentis has lost its
support as a viable theory.
D. Implied Contract Theory
The implied contract theory has been widely employed to de-
scribe the relationship between students and the university." The
30. Nordin, The Contract to Educate: Toward a More Workable Theory of the Stu-
dent-University Relationship, 8 J. COLL. & U.L. 141 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Nordin,
More Workable Theory].
31. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
34. In loco parentis translates "in the place of a parent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
708 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
35. The reasoning of Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 156 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961), sounded the death knell of the in loco parentis the-
ory. Dixon recognized constitutional rights of students in their relationship with the institution
by finding the relationship to be unlike the parental analogue in which the child enjoys few
constitutional rights.
36. 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913) (sustaining college regulation designed to safe-
guard the welfare of the students that forbade students from patronizing local eating establish-
ments and "places of amusement."
37. Id. at 379, 161 S.W. at 206.
38. See supra note 27.
39. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
40. While the contract theory applies to both private and public schools, it has been
particularly serviceable in private schools where it is often the only avenue of redress for stu-
theory assumes that upon enrollment the student and the institution
have entered into a voluntary contract, "1 the terms of which are
found in the express provisions of institutional catalogues and
brochures,'4 2 as supplemented by terms implied from the parties' rea-
sonable expectations.4' Essentially, the "contract" insures that stu-
dents who comply with the institution's terms will not be arbitrarily
refused an otherwise deserved degree."
Judicial application of contract principles to an academic con-
text evinces a lack of mutuality. While contract theory has served as
a fertile source of authority for the institution's legal position, 45 it
has been of limited effectiveness in conferring or protecting students'
rights.4" The courts have touted the contractual nature of the rela-
tionship; yet judicial decisions reflect an unwillingness to apply tradi-
tional contract principles.4' As a result, most judgments unduly favor
the institution. The appropriateness of applying contract theory to
the student-institutional relationship is not without its critics. Much
dent grievances. See also infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
41. As an example, the school's informational brochure on campus housing is an invita-
tion to students to make an offer. The student's housing deposit represents the offer and the
school's voluntary reception of the deposit, the acceptance. For a similar analysis of the overall
contract with the institution, see Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 41 Ill. App. 3d 804,
354 N.E.2d 586 (1976) (applicant to medical school entitled to have his application judged
according to school's criteria as stated in bulletin).
42. Id.
43. Nordin, More Workable Theory, supra note 30, at 158-64.
44. Andersen v. Regents of Univ. of California, 22 Cal. App. 3d 763, 769, 99 Cal. Rptr.
531, 535 (1972) (two implied conditions arise as result of student's matriculation: (I) student
rules will be reasonable; (2) students will not be arbitrarily expelled).
45. A classic example of the one-sided approach courts have taken with respect to the
application of contract principles to student initiated suits can be found in Anthony v. Syra-
cuse Univ., 224 A.D. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928). Ms. Anthony, a fourth year home econom-
ics student, was dismissed by Syracuse University on the basis of unsubstantiated rumors that
she was not a "typical Syracuse girl." The court sustained the explusion on the basis of a
contract which Anthony had signed authorizing the University's right to request withdrawal
without cause in order to safeguard the moral atmosphere on campus. The court placed the
burden of proof on the student. To succeed, Anthony was required to prove that the dismissal
did not comport with the terms of the contract. In reality, Anthony was asked to disprove an
allegation which the university had refused to reveal to her. The court upheld the explusion.
46. Courts seem loathe to recognize any student rights under a contract theory. In Basch
v. George Washington Univ., 370 A.2d 1364 (D.C. 1977), the medical school raised tuition to
$12,500 for the upcoming year. A group of students brought suit alleging that the university
had breached the contract by raising the tuition despite language in the school's bulletin spe-
cifically setting tuition at $3,200. The bulletin contained a proviso warning that it was not
always possible to project increases with accuracy. The court held that at best, these provisions
created an expectancy regarding future increases but not a promise susceptible of enforcement.
Id. at 1368.
47. Examples of areas in which contract analysis in academic settings has diverged from
traditional contract analysis are as follows: burden of proof placed on students rather than
institution, Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 A.D. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928); unwillingness to
construe ambiguous terms against the drafter, Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 A.D.2d 632, 231
N.Y.S.2d 410, rev'd, 34 Misc. 2d 319, 231 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 12 N.Y.2d
802, 187 N.E.2d 18, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962); refusal to strictly apply adhesion contract
principles. See also Comment, Private Government on the Campus-Judicial Review of Uni-
versity Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1377-79 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Pri-
vate Government on the Campus].
of the criticism, however, can be attributed to the inconsistent appli-
cation of contract principles rather than its efficacy.48
E. Constitutional Theory
Constitutional theory is less a characterization of the relation-
ship between the student and institution than a limitation on the in-
stitution's power to enforce rules and regulations. Belated judicial
recognition of student legal rights arrived with the landmark case of
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education,49 which categorically
established limits on the discretionary disciplinary authority of col-
leges and universities by holding that students are entitled to consti-
tutional safeguards, which in turn, circumscribe institutional
authority. 0
Cognizant of the import of a college degree, the Dixon court
pronounced:
It is not enough to say . . . the right to attend a public college
or university is not in and of itself a constitutional right ...
One may not have a constitutional right to go to Bagdad, but
the Government may not prohibit one from going there unless
by means consonant with due process of law. 1
Dixon mandated that colleges and universities observe the "rudi-
ments of fair play" in disciplining students. 2 The procedural re-
quirements necessary to satisfy this mandate will depend upon the
facts and interests involved in each case."
F. Other Theories
Commentators and jurists have posited a number of lesser theo-
ries. The most notable are the status theory, 4 the fiduciary theory,55
48. See Nordin, More Workable Theory, supra note 30, at 145.
49. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
50. Id. at 156. The court in Dixon went on to state: "[l]t nonetheless remains true that
the State cannot condition the granting of even a privilege upon the renunciation of the consti-
tutional right to procedural due process." Id.
51. Id. (quoting Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
894 (1961)).
52. 294 F.2d 150, 155 (5th Cir. 1961).
53. Id. While the court insisted on a flexible approach to due process requirements, the
following procedural safeguards in an expulsion action were suggested: (a) student should be
given notice of the specific charges; (b) some form of a hearing should be conducted to hear
both sides of the case; (c) student should have the opportunity to present a defense; (d) the
findings and results of the hearing should be presented in a report open to the student. Id. at
158-59.
54. The status theory rests on the premise that the rights and duties of students and the
institution inhere in the "status" of the parties as developed through customs, tradition and
usage. To date, the theory has only been used in conjunction with other theories. See R. RAT-
LIFF, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF COLLEGE STUDENTS: A STUDY IN CASE LAW 48 (1972).
55. The fiduciary theory was first announced in Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due
Process," 70 HARV. L. REV. 1406 (1956-57), and further developed in Goldman, The Univer-
and the statutory theory. 6 None of these theories, however, have en-
joyed widespread acceptance. Judges, most probably because of ad-
herence to the doctrine of academic abstention, appear to select and
advance the theory which most conveniently permits a finding in
favor of the institution.
G. Summary
Although evolving, the scope of judicial review of university de-
cision-making is still narrowly drawn. Thus, institutional discretion
remains broad. Consequently, courts hesitate to invalidate rules or
decisions unless proven to be clearly arbitrary."' This limited role of
the judiciary endangers the institution's integrity as well as students'
rights.58 It is also an abdication of judicial responsibility.
III. The Alliance of Group Billing and Residence Halls
A. Residence Halls and Student Development
The missions of higher education encompass far more than
building only the intellect.5 ' The college experience has been identi-
fied as a period of dramatic personal development for the student.10
The academic community as a whole and residence halls in particu-
lar are instrumental in providing an environment ripe with develop-
mental opportunities,61 and the beneficial effects of on-campus hous-
ing have been hailed by both academicians and jurists.62
The concept of community is central to the rationale of student
sity and the Liberty of Its Students-A Fiduciary Theory, 54 Ky. L.J. 643 (1966). The the-
ory perceives the institution as a fiduciary with the primary duty to act for the benefit of the
students.
56. The statutory theory holds that the institution's power to discipline arises from spe-
cific state statutory grants of power to the governing board of the institution. See R. RATLIFF,
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF COLLEGE STUDENTS: A STUDY IN CASE LAW 48 (1972).
57. See e.g., Foley v. Benedict, 122 Tex, 193, 55 S.W.2d 805 (1932) (Board of Regents
has power to determine what classes of persons shall be admitted to university, provided rules
are reasonable and not arbitrary).
58. "The injury to the student, and possibly to the community, which arises from a
failure to review school regulations with a sufficient regard for the student's interest suggests
that the court should not conceive of their role as strictly limited." Perkins, Developments,
supra note 17, at 1148.
59. Learning is a total process. The student operates "as a total organism, not a disem-
bodied mind delivered for nurture to the college or university. He is a living human being with
a physique, emotions, and a stage of development-all of which influence his mind and learn-
ing." D. DECOSTER & P. MABLE, STUDENT DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION IN COLLEGE RES-
IDENCE HALLS 25 (1974).
60. Parker, Student Development: What Does It Mean? J. COLLEGE AND STUDENT PER-
SONNEL, July, 248 (1974) (reviewing uses and meanings of the term "student development").
61. Chickering, College Residences and Student Development, 48 EDUC. REC. 179
(1967).
62. See e.g., Prostrollo v. University of South Dakota, 507 F.2d 775, 777 (8th Cir. 1974)
(upholding a parietal rule requiring freshmen and sophomores to live in university housing as a
reasonable regulation designed to meet an educational objective).
housing and the developmental process.6s A synergy exists between
group or shared responsibility and community living arrangements
which necessarily entails self-discipline as shaped by group norms."
As many of the attitudes and values of students are created and rein-
forced as a result of peer pressure, if residence halls are to promote
student development, the normative system must reflect the educa-
tional goals of the institution.66
Because of these goals fundamental demand of community liv-
ing is the subjugation of personal freedoms which interfere with a
safe and secure environment conducive to academic pursuits. This
adjustment, however, does not transpire without protest-protest
which often takes the form of misconduct disruptive to the commu-
nity.66 Given the nature of community living, responses to miscon-
duct must be designed to address inappropriate group norms as well
as promote internal control.
B. Institutions as "Landlords ".6 Attendant Duties
Students who live in college-operated residence halls have a spe-
cial relationship with the institution. Thus, courts have recognized
that students must submit to the university's dominion to a far
63. See Jerome, The Living-Learning Community, CHANGE, Sept. 3 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Jerome, The Living-Learning Community]; E. WILLIAMSON & D. BRIGGS, STUDENT
PERSONNEL WORK 329 (1975).
64. "Residence halls are composed of peer groups that are sets of two or more residents
whose relationships to one another are such as to exert influence upon them as individuals."
Jerome, The Living-Learning Community, supra note 63.
65. R. Slepitza, S. Neverett, & T. Scheuermann, Coping With Student Behavior
Problems in the Residence Halls: A Systems Model (July 1980) (unpublished paper sponsored
by the Department of Resident Life, University of Maryland, College Park) [hereinafter cited
as Slepitza, Coping With Student Behavior Problems].
66. Residence halls have a "long and lusty" history in American higher education.
There has never been universal acceptance of their value in the university. Criticisms have
described "dormitory life" as unnatural and evil, dating back to the inception of the first dor-
mitory and as "help[ing] to create an atmosphere [of] frustration, argument and crime." A
chronicle of residence halls reveals that duels, stabbings and stonings were not uncommon. See
F. RUDOLPH, THE AMERICAN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY 96-97 (1962).
67. For the most part, the analogy of institutions as landlords and students as tenants
has failed to gain support. The terms and conditions of the residence hall contract are seen as
inconsistent with the commonly understood landlord-tenant relationship: rooms are assigned by
the college; roommates cannot be selected as a matter of right, and; occupancy of residence
hall space is not comparable to the exclusive possession of residential premises, without which
possession an occupant is deemed to be a mere licensee. Other factors which negate the exis-
tence of a landlord-tenant relationship include the requirement that students vacate the prem-
ises at certain times such as holidays and semester breaks, the use of common facilities such as
bathrooms and lounges, rules providing for automatic termination of residence rights upon
withdrawal as a student, and the furnishing of services such as housekeeping and trash re-
moval. Md. Att'y Gen. Opinion, Applicability of Provisions of Md. Ann. Code § 8-203 on
Security Deposits to College Residence Halls (July 31, 1975). See also Cook v. University
Plaza, 100 III. App. 3d 752, 427 N.E.2d 405 (1981); Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of
Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Houle v. Adams State College, 547
P.2d 926 (Colo. 1976).
greater degree that non-residents. 8
The orderly operation of residence halls necessarily requires
rules and regulations. While an institution is not expected to police
the morals or regulate the private lives of resident students,69 the law
has imposed an affirmative duty on schools to promote and maintain
an environment within the halls that is consonant with the educa-
tional process.70 Additionally, residence hall administrators must ex-
ercise reasonable care to secure the safety and security of resident
students.71 The cases have not gone so far as to suggest that the
institution is an insurer of students' safety, however, the university is
generally recognized as more than a mere bystander. 72 Although this
duty smacks of the in loco parentis doctrine, courts have instead
cited the special relationship,73 general community expectations, 7"
and the institution's assumption of the duty7 '5 to justify its imposi-
tion. These justifications are bolstered by the implicit warranty of
safety and security found in university residency requirements.7 6
Irrespective of the rationale behind the duty, institutions must
develop workable methods by which safety and security can be main-
tained. Students should share in the responsibility for insuring a safe
and secure environment, yet their conduct often conflicts with this
goal. Therefore, administrators often resort to group billing as an
appropriate intervention."
68. See e.g., Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 730
(M.D. Ala. 1968) (reasonable right of inspection of student's room in residence hall is neces-
sary to educational institution's duty to maintain an academic environment, even though in-
spection may infringe on outer boundaries of students' fourth amendment rights).
69. Gunston v. Mills College of Oakland, No. 41-1661 (Cal. Sup. April 28, 1971), cited
in M. Chambers, THE COLLEGE AND THE COURTS 106 (1972) (institutions of higher education
are not nursery schools and students are presumed to have sufficient maturity to handle their
own personal affairs).
70. Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 730 (M.D.
Ala. 1968); see supra note 68.
71. "It can be said with confidence that colleges of ordinary prudence customarily exer-
cise care to protect the well-being of their resident students." Mullins v. Pine Manor College,
389 Mass. 47, 449 N.E.2d 331 (1983) (holding college negligent for inadequate security which
resulted in plaintiff being raped on campus).
72. Duarte v. State of California, 88 Cal. App. 3d 254, 151 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1979) (sus-
taining cause of action for wrongful death of student who was murdered and raped in resi-
dence hall).
73. Id. at 258, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
74. The fact that a college need not police the morals of its resident students does
not entitle it to abandon any effort to ensure their physical safety. Parents, stu-
dents and the general community can still have a reasonable expectation, fos-
tered in part by the colleges themselves, that reasonable care be exercised to
protect students from unreasonable harm.
Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 51, 449 N.E.2d 331, 335 (1983).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 53, 449 N.E.2d at 337.
77. See supra note 5; see also discussion infra.
C. Goals of Group Billing: Norming or Cost Recovery?
Although most schools employ group billing in some form, there
is no consensus as to the motive behind the practice. Some colleges
regard group billing solely as a means of recouping financial losses.
Other institutions consider it primarily a valuable behavioral man-
agement tool with any financial recovery being purely incidental. 78
It is recognized that vandalism is caused by only a small per-
centage of the student population.7 9  Group billing, however,
presumes that students as a group bear the responsibility for dam-
ages when an individual group member is destructive. The nature of
community living justifies the presumption. A successful community
necessarily requires participation and shared responsibility. The pas-
sive bystander, as well as the tacit supporter, is an accomplice for
group billing purposes.80 Students who elect to live in residence halls
are expected to affirmatively promote and maintain a positive
environment. 1
Group billing, for institutions which posit cost recovery as the
underlying goal, is an accountability process. While behavioral ac-
countability seeks to exert external control over student conduct,
schools which implement group billing to shape behavior are evi-
dently more concerned with encouraging students to adapt and inter-
nalize expectations as their own. Some educators would argue that
only through internalization can a self-disciplined residence hall en-
vironment be achieved.8 2
No matter which goal is viewed as primary, group billing usu-
ally implicates both cost recovery and group behavioral manage-
ment. Institutional rules based on pure economic justifications that
adversely affect students have not fared well." Prudent institutions
78. Of the thirty schools surveyed for this comment, one-half indicated that their pri-
mary goal in implementing group billing was financial reimbursement; the other half cited
both cost recovery and behavioral management as the motivating forces.
79. Situational Analyses: Ellicott Hall 6 (July 1980) (proposal for implementation of
group billing at University of Maryland, College Park).
80. Id.
81. A typical representation made by an institution in a student handbook reads as
follows:
Swarthmore's housing philosophy is based on the belief that residence hall
living enhances education by contributing to an individual's academic, social,
and personal development. If residence halls are to provide an environment for
personal growth, residents must accept responsibility for their own actions and
act in a manner which demonstrates respect for the rights and concerns of
others.
SWARTHMORE COLLEGE: STUDENT HANDBOOK, 1983-84, at 39.
82. See J. KATZ & N. SANFORD, THE AMERICAN COLLEGE (1962) (solely using power
to resolve disciplinary problems is not conducive to the development of an internally-directed,
self-disciplined populace).
83. See, e.g., Texas Woman's Univ. v. Chayklintaste, 521 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975) (holding that mere financial reasons are insufficient to justify the imposition of a regula-
tion which treated male and female students differently).
may therefore wish to advance both goals as rationales for a group
billing procedure.
D. The Mechanics of Group Billing
Institutions are with increasing frequency embodying their
group billing practice in residence hall contracts or handbooks.8, The
actual implementation of such schemes is as varied as the institu-
tions practicing group billing are numerous. A common device is the
damage or security deposit method. Each student is required to de-
posit a specified amount with the school from which the cost of dam-
ages is deducted on a pro rata basis.85 Another method involves the
posting of periodic bills to the student's account.
The cost to the individual student varies with the physical area
and the amount of damage for which the student is held accounta-
ble.86 For example, the area of responsibility may be limited to a
floor, a building or a complex of buildings. Notice provisions and
appeal processes also vary from school to school, but the effect of
failure to pay one's bill usually does not. Students who do not satisfy
their debts to the school are often prohibited from recontracting for
housing and registering for classes.87
For many institutions, group billing is a standard operating pro-
cedure. Others implement the process on an ad hoc basis. At these
schools, group billing is triggered by an administrative determination
that vandalism has surpassed a tolerable limit.88 Group billing is
then imposed on particular living units or instituted campus-wide.
84. Every school surveyed which employed group billing has a residence hall contract
provision concerning damage policy. The following is typical:
XVI. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
The student and the guarantors shall be individually liable, and jointly liable
with other students for items missing or damages done to rooming accommoda-
tions, the furniture therein, and areas of the residence hall which are used in
common with other persons. If responsibility for damages in common areas can-
not be determined, all residents of a particular hall or building will share equally
and be billed jointly for the cost of these damages or missing items.
KUTZTOWN UNIV.: HOUSING AGREEMENT, 1983-84.
85. Typically, any amount left over after deductions at the end of the term is refunded
to the student.
86. The process can be best understood with an example: Student X lives on a floor of
twenty students in a building of 80 students. X shares responsibility for all damages in his
room with his roommate. Damages to the floor lounge, bathroom and hallways are distributed
equally among all twenty students. All eighty students share the costs for damages to the
common lobby. If the vandalism occurs in an area for which X is primarily responsible, his
costs will be higher as there are fewer students among which to distribute the costs.
87. This policy is not unique to group billing charges but is rather a standard operating
procedure usually affecting any unpaid student bills.
88. See, e.g., SUSQUEHANNA COLL.: RESIDENCE AND BOARD CONTRACT, 1983-84:
In halls or sections where the University has determined that the majority of the
residents are consistently tolerating undue abuse of University property and the
responsible individuals cannot be identified, all residents will be held responsible
for paying a per capita share of the cost of repairing such damage.
Administrators can implement innumerable variants of group
billing. Ultimately, the plan selected may prove decisive in the reso-
lution of a resulting legal challenge. 8
IV. Reconciling Group Billing with Traditional Tort Liability
Principles 0
A. Duty to Control Fellow Students' Behavior
To require students to respect and maintain their physical envi-
ronment is not an unduly burdensome request. Group billing is pre-
mised on the assumption that students can and should regulate or
influence the conduct of fellow students. The imposition of an affirm-
ative duty to control third parties is not a new concept. However,
there is a difference between imposing moral or ethical duties and
legal duties.9' Whether the duty levied under a group billing scheme
is justifiable depends upon a number of considerations.
The distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance lies at the
heart of any discussion of the parameters of legal duty.92 No distinc-
tion is more "deeply rooted in the common law and more fundamen-
tal than that between misfeasance and nonfeasance, between active
misconduct working positive injury to others and passive inaction, a
failure to take positive steps to benefit others, or protect them from
harm ... "93
The conduct upon which group billing rests can be appropri-
ately classified as nonfeasance. In general, the law has hesitated to
countenance nonfeasance as a basis for liability." This reluctance
originated in the individualistic philosophy that men are independent
and self-reliant,90 and in the belief that courts should not be instru-
89. See infra notes 178-263 and accompanying text.
90. This section examines group billing in isolation from any contractual agreement
which may exist between the institution and the student. Fault-free loss bearing may be justi-
fied where agreed to contractually. Coleman, The Morality of Strict Tort Liability, 18 Wm. &
MARY L. REv. 259, 285 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Coleman, Morality of Strict Tort
Liability].
91. This discrepancy is most salient in the common law's refusal to require that one aid
another who is in peril. See e.g., Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901)
(physician not bound to aid individual in danger of death); Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73,
160 N.E. 301 (1928) (no liability attaches to expert swimmer who callously observes a man
drown). Criticism of the common law has worked some changes: two states have legislatively
imposed a duty upon their citizens to rescue persons in danger. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §
519 (1973); MINN. STAT. § 604.05 (1983).
92. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54 at 334 (3d ed. 1964)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS].
93. Bohlen, The Moral Duty To Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L.
REv. 217, 219 (1908).
94. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS supra note 92 § 54, at 334. Prosser suggests that by a
misfeasance the actor creates a new risk of harm; while by non-feasance, the actor has not
created a risk or worsened the situation. Id.
95. McNiece & Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272, 1288 (1949)
ments of compulsion, forcing men to help one another.96 Limiting
one's liberty to act is perceived as a less serious restraint than requir-
ing a person to act.97
Factual settings in which an affirmative duty has arisen are not
definitively distinguishable from those in which no duty ensues.
However, one ingredient is common to all of the scenarios to which
affirmative duties have attached: the nature of the relationship be-
tween the actors. By exploring these relational attributes it is possi-
ble to determine whether students and the institution enjoy the req-
uisite relationship.
B. Characteristics of Affirmative Duty Relationships
One theme common to most affirmative duties is the "benefit
principle."" Thus, affirmative duties will be imposed in situations
"where the one under a duty to act has voluntarily brought himself
into a certain relationship with others from which he obtains or ex-
pects benefit." 99 The compensatory nature of the relationship is such
an advantage as to justify the imposition of an obligation.10
An example of the benefit principle is seen in the case of the
common carrier: the carrier obtains economic advantage from the
passengers and the duty to protect the passengers is the "price" of
that benefit.101 The benefit principle is, however, inapposite to the
student-university relationship. The student typically does not enter
into the relationship with college residence halls in order to procure
an economic advantage. 102 Under the benefit principle, where there
is no benefit, there is no duty to act.
Affirmative duties have also been assigned to relations on a
more amorphous basis. The law has fastened certain duties on rela-
tionships when the "decencies of society" require the affirmative
duty for its orderly regulation: "If the conduct of the actor has
brought him into a relationship with another that sound policy re-
quires either some affirmative action or some precaution on his part
to avoid harm, the duty to act is imposed by law."' 1 3 This obligation
[hereinafter cited as McNiece & Thornton, Affirmative Duties].
96. Id.
97. Id. For a discussion of the validity of these assumptions, see Hale, Prima Facie
Torts. Combinations and Non-Feasance, 46 COL. L. REv. 196 (1946).
98. Id. at 1282 (the author credits Bohlen as expounding the theory of benefit as the
basis for a positive duty); see supra note 93.
99. Id. at 1282-83.
100. Id. at 1283.
101. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Byrd, 89 Miss. 308, 42 So. 286 (1906); see also
Arterboum, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 411 (1927).
102. One could argue that a student does derive benefit from a college degree through
increased job and salary potential. However, those benefits flow from the student's relationship
with the university at large irrespective of whether a student resides on campus.
103. Harper & Kime, The Duty To Control The Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886
also extends to harms or risks created by third parties."0 4
Two different relationships can trigger the duty to control the
conduct of third parties.105 An individual may stand in such a rela-
tion to the third party that a duty attaches, or the individual may
stand in such a relation to the party exposed to harm that he must
take precautions to prevent harm."" The inquiry then focuses on
whether a residence hall student enjoys such a relationship with ei-
ther other students or the institution that policy demands the imposi-
tion of a duty to control fellow students' conduct.
Irrespective of the contractual relationship of students with the
university, there is no sound policy reason for holding students
financially responsible for the misconduct of others based solely on
the association of student and institution. From an abstract perspec-
tive, the relationship is no different from that of any lessor-lessee.107
It is beyond cavil that a parallel duty on typical lessees would ever
by sanctioned.
The unique relationship between students who live together in
residence halls is more pertinent. The ability to "control" the con-
duct of a wrongdoer emerges as the crucial factor in assigning af-
firmative duties.108 For this reason, parents have been held vicari-
ously liable for failing to control their children. 0 9 In addition, a car
owner is said to be in control of those who drive the car in his pres-
ence. Consequently, the car owner may be held liable for failing to
prevent negligent driving."0 Finally, a physician in control of an op-
eration may be legally responsible for failing to prevent the negligent
acts of his assistants."'
Residence hall environments are conducive to the use of peer
pressure as a means of controlling the behavior of students."' Halls
are physically structured so that specific communities within the
larger residence hall can be identified for administrative purposes.
Each community or "unit" develops its own mores, largely as a func-
(1934) [hereinafter cited as Harper, Duty To Control].
104. F. HARPER, LAW OF TORTS 197 (1933). See also Melecharek v. Hill Bus Co., 70
N.J. Super. 150, 175 A.2d 238 (1961) (duty of public carrier to its passengers requires the use
of reasonable care to prevent harm from third parties).
105. Harper, Duty to Control, supra note 103, at 887.
106. Id. at 887-88.
107. But cf. supra note 67 and accompanying text.
108. The "control" of the party to be charged with liability over the actor has been
emphasized uniformly by nearly all the courts and commentators. See Note, Constitutional
Caveat on the Vicarious Liability of Parents, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW 1321 (1972).
109. With few exceptions, at common law, a parent was not liable for the torts of his
child. In some states the legislature has imposed civil liability on parents for the acts of their
children. See Note, Parental Responsibility in New York For An Infant's Willful Property
Damage, 44 ALBANY L. REV. 943 (1980).
110. Parks v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 315 Mich. 38, 23 N.W.2d 196 (1946).
111. Roberts v. Posey, 386 Mich. 656, 194 N.W.2d 310 (1972).
112. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
tion of peer pressure. 1 3 Unilateral efforts by the institution to alter
or change behavior in a living unit are usually far less effective than
peer pressure and internalized motivations for change emanating
from within the unit.
1 4
The requisite "control" running through all of these factual set-
tings need not be actual in fact." 5 Not every student has the ability
to physically control the conduct of every other student on the living
unit. Nor can the car owner always control the driver of the car, nor
the master his servant. Control can be actual or fictitious, and is
employed by courts as a convenient device for policy determinations
of who can best avoid the harm."'
C. Joint and Pro Rata Liability
While at first blush it seems unfair to hold students responsible
for the misconduct of other students, group billing can be justified by
traditional tort analysis. Under group billing, all students within a
designated living area are held financially accountable on a pro rata
basis whenever the actual culprit cannot be pinpointed. From the
university's perspective, each student is a joint tortfeasorl" and vi-
cariously liable for the misconduct of the "wrongdoer" student.
Imputed or vicarious liability means that by reason of the rela-
tion of the wrongdoer to the other students, the wrongdoer's negli-
gence is charged against the rest of the students" 8 regardless of
whether other students may have done nothing to encourage or aid
in the wrongdoing." 9
The modern justification for vicarious liability is that it amounts
113. College housing units develop distinctive "subcultures" which influence stu-
dents' behavior. The subculture of a unit or floor becomes a "reference group"
for the residents. Once an individual identifies himself with a particular group,
the group becomes a reference point:
The values and behavioral norms of the group provide a background against
which the individual's decisions about behavior, and his modification of values
and attitudes, occur. When the group becomes important, the individual tries to
maintain his position within it by behaving appropriately and by demonstrating
competencies relevant to the group's needs and values by the group members.
Chickering, College Residences and Student Development, 48 EDUC. REC. 179, 184 (1967).
114. Id.
115. Harper, Duty to Control, supra note 103, at 891.
116. Id.
117. Prosser notes that the term "joint tortfeasor" has been surrounded by much confu-
sion. He suggests that meaning can be lent to the term only by focusing on the consequences of
liability which follows from a finding of joint tortious activity. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs, supra
note 92, at 258.
118. Id. at 470.
119. Id. Compare this disregard for "fault" with the concerted action concept. The orig-
inal meaning of "joint tort" was vicarious liability for concerted action: all those who, in pur-
suance of a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, actively take part or encourage
the wrongdoer are liable. Unlike the group billing situation, any individual charged with re-
sponsibility must have a tortious intent. Duke v. Feldman, 248 Md. 454, 456, 226 A.2d 345,
347 (1967).
to a policy rule for risk allocation.12 0 Group billing reflects the policy
decision that the student-to-student relationship renders students far
more capable of avoiding and absorbing the loss than the institution.
D. An Economic Perspective
Economists have long espoused the theory that the civil law
should be concerned less with fault and more with the question of
risk allocation.12 1 Indeed, every case in which harm is established
involves loss allocation, and the relative abilities of the parties to
bear the loss necessarily influences decisions. Furthermore, the com-
panion ability to prevent or avoid the loss is another factor in the
calculus. 122
Group billing is a public-oriented proposition concerned more
with the institution's right to compensation than with the cost to the
innocent individual student."2 The decision of who should recom-
pense need not coincide with any notions of fault."14 Likewise, com-
pensation is a useful social tool for expressing public disapproval of
certain standards of conduct.
25
The primary goal of cost minimization is to allocate costs of
"accidents" and costs of avoiding "accidents". 1 6 For example, the
institution could choose not to group bill but rather to absorb the
cost of damages. The costs could then be passed on to all students in
their board rates. While the institution would still be compensated,
the incentives for avoiding loss are displaced. The relationship be-
tween an individual student's efforts to minimize vandalism and that
student's ultimate bill is attenuated. From a behavioral management
perspective, therefore, group billing is preferable.""
Alternatively, the institution could concentrate only on ascer-
taining the wrongdoer's identity. Any unattributable costs would be
absorbed. Realistically, the school would never be able to recoup all
of its losses.'2 8 Furthermore, economic efficiency would not be served
120. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 92, at 259.
121. For an introduction to the economic model of law and the "risk spreading" analysis
of tort law, see Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960) and G.
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
122. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 92, at 22.
123. This utilitarian creed has been summarized: "Public policy sacrifices the individual
to the general good . . . and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger inter-
ests on the other side of the scales." 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (1881).
124. Coleman, Morality of Strict Liability, supra note 90, at 271.
125. Id. at 277.
126. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 205 (1973).
127. It has been suggested that the failure of a community to punish "legally" may lead
to a breakdown of moral sanctions from the community members and to increased alienation
of individuals. Rudolph, The Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule, 44 NEB. L. REV. 499, 499
(1965).
128. Identification of vandals is a difficult task. A "code of silence" exists among stu-
dents which inhibits assistance in investigations. Without student cooperation, the investigation
by the expenditure of the substantial financial and human resources
necessary to identify the responsible parties.
Vandalism is more than the result of isolated incidents of indi-
vidual misconduct. Much of the destructive behavior in residence
halls is a function of group dynamics. If intervention tools are
designed only to deal with individuals, then the problem will never
be alleviated. 129 Group billing, however, can be an effective and effi-
cient norming device. It focuses on motivating both the individual
and the group to avoid or prevent damages. The deterrence aspect of
group billing is best realized by causing the party that makes the
decision to act to absorb the cost of such action. 130 Thus, in the case
of joint tortfeasors, costs are apportioned among all the students.
Each student then internalizes the costs allocated and the correct
level of deterrence is achieved.'
From an institutional perspective, then, group billing is perhaps
defensible. However, from the vantage point of the students, group
billing raises a host of unresolved issues.
V. Constitutionality of Group Billing
A. Private v. Public Institutions
Students do not shed their constitutional protections at the
schoolhouse doors. 82 As arms of government, the exercise of power
by state colleges and universities is limited by substantive and proce-
dural constitutional guarantees. These safeguards are afforded only
to students attending state institutions. Students at private schools
are not "clothed with the protections" of the Constitution, 3' despite
the fact that many commentators have advocated abrogation of the
distinction for policy reasons. 184 Because most attempts to apply due
usually fails to identify the wrongdoer.
129. Given that individuals are often influenced by peer groups, effective interventions
must address inappropriate group norms and behavior as well as individual. Hall, The Individ-
ual and the Group: Can They be Separated, 29 J. NAT'L Assoc. OF WOMEN DEANS AND
COUNSELORS 65 (1966).
130. Dobson v. Camden, 705 F.2d 759, 767 (5th Cir. 1983) (discussing the deterrence
policy of § 1983 and proportional deductions for joint tortfeasors).
131. Id.
132. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). Dis-
cussing the mutuality of the student-school relationship, Justice Fortas stated: "Students in
school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of
fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their
obligations to the State." Id. at 511.
133. Miller v. Long Island Univ., 85 Misc. 2d 393, 398, 380 N.Y.S.2d 917, 921 (1976);
see also Counts v. Vorhees College, 312 F. Supp. 598 (D.S.C. 1970).
134. Several commentators have argued that institutions of higher education, as exem-
plars, should not be allowed to take refuge in the private-public distinction. The progressive
role of higher education in society dictates that institutions afford students due process rights
irrespective of the private or public nature of the school. To do otherwise demeans the integrity
of the institution as a whole. See Mash, Student Discipline in Higher Education: A Collision
process strictures to private schools on state action135 or public func-





B. Substantive Due Process: Punishment Without Fault
The prohibition against the deprivation of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law finds expression in the fifth13 8 and
fourteenth amendments. 13' These safeguards have their roots in the
notion that personal freedoms can be preserved only by an institu-
tional check on arbitrary government action.140 The due process
clause restrains procedures which abridge any "fundamental princi-
ples of liberty or justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government.'
4 1
A challenge to group billing on substantive due process
142
grounds may find support in the constitutional proscription against
imposing punishment absent personal guilt. Society's abhorrence of
punishment without fault is reflected in countless judicial holdings 143
Course with the Courts? 8 NASPA J. 148 (1971); Comment, Private Government on the
Campus, supra note 47, at 1381-86.
135. Constitutional restrictions have been found applicable to private schools where
"state action" has been found. The test for state action involves an examination of the extent
to which the state participates in the enterprise and the extent to which the enterprise acts
under color of state authority. State action must encompass more than the provision of certain
governmental benefits which are available to all schools or students. The state must "either
have significant control over an input into the policy-making process of the private institution,
or be so involved in the financing and running of the institution that it in effect facilitates the
constitutional violation complained of." Wisch v. Sanford School, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1310,
1313-14 (D. Del. 1976).
136. Underlying the public function argument is the proposition that the function of
colleges as educators of students is sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute state action. While
the public may benefit from the fact that colleges educate the citizenry, the public function
argument as applied to a private institution has been expressly rejected. See Swanson v. Wes-
ley College, Inc., - Del. Super. -, 402 A.2d 401, 403 (1979).
137. In theory, the considerations that spurred the judiciary to recognize the role of due
process in state institutions are equally pertinent to private schools:
[Olur sense of justice should be outraged by the denial to students of the normal
safeguards. . . . It is shocking that the officials . . . should not understand the
elementary principles of fair play. It is equally shocking to find that a court
supports them in denying to a student the protection given to a pickpocket.
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961) quoting Seavey,
Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARV. L. REV. 1406, 1406-07 (1957)).
138. ". . . nor shall any person be subject to the same offence ... nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;" U.S. CONST. amend. V.
139. ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law;" U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
140. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 501 (1978).
141. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908).
142. Substantive due process refers to the constitutional limitations on the content of
legislative action. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 503 (1978).
143. See e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) ("It is far worse to convict an
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."); Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206
(1960) ("[I1t is a violation of due process to convict and punish a man without evidence of his
guilt."); Calder v. Bull, I U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 387-88 (1798) ("1 cannot subscribe to the om-
nipotence of a State Legislature, or that it is absolute and without control. . . . [T]he legisla-
and springs from the American political system's foundations. 14" The
right to be free from punishment without fault is not expressly em-
bodied in the Bill of Rights or in any specific statute. Rather, the
source of the right can be found in the meaning of "liberty".
145
In 1974, the court in St. Ann v. Palisi'46 considered the "right"
to be free from punishment within an academic context. At issue in
St. Ann was a school board regulation' 7 that authorized suspension
of pupils for "misconduct" by their parents. Pursuant to this regula-
tion, two children were suspended and transferred as a result of an
altercation between their mother and the assistant vice-principal.
The facts revealed that the mother had struck the school administra-
tor during a heated argument. 4 8
After careful consideration, the court invalidated the regulation.
The court did not question the school's authority to formulate rules
to maintain discipline and to further its educational mission.' 9 How-
ever, the court felt obliged to intervene because the school had used
its discretionary authority in contravention of fundamental constitu-
tional liberties. 50 The court concluded that personal guilt as a pre-
requisite to punishment is a fundamental component of the Ameri-
can scheme of liberty.' 0 ' The due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment protects these fundamental liberties from encroachments
by the state. In order for a court to sustain a regulation that im-
pinged upon a fundamental liberty, the state must satisfy a substan-
tial burden of justification.5 2 The court in St. Ann found the state's
arguments unavailing.
It is possible to analogize the reasoning in St. Ann to group bill-
ture may command what is right and prohibit what is wrong, but they cannot change inno-
cence into guilt, or punish innocence as a crime."). See also Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203 (1961).
144. The natural law concepts of John Locke influenced the foundations of American
political thinking. One of the most fundamental natural rights of an individual is the right to
be free from sanctions unless the state first proves that the individual freely and with under-
standing chose to violate a command of the law. Hippard, The Unconstitutionality of Criminal
Liability Without Fault, 10 Hous. L. REv. 1039, 1041 (1973).
145. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 580 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
146. 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1974).
147. Orleans Parish School Board Regulation XIX:
Should principal or teacher be called to account or be reproved in an offensive
manner in the classroom or elsewhere, verbally or in writing, by a parent or
guardian, the child or ward of such parent or guardian shall, by reason of such
conduct, be liable to suspension or other punishment.
Id. at 424 n.1.
148. Id. at 424.
149. Id. at 424-25.
150. Id.
151. "In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at large to decide
cases in light of their personal and private notions. Rather, they must look to the 'traditions
and [collective] conscience of our people' to determine whether a principle is 'so rooted . . . as
to be ranked as fundamental.' Id. at 425 n.5 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 241 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)).
152. Id. at 427.
ing. Like secondary schools, higher education institutions tradition-
ally possess broad inherent authority to promulgate rules and regula-
tions to maintain discipline and order."" But, as demonstrated in St.
Ann, rules that infringe protected student interests may be subject to
stricter scrutiny.
The interest common to the pupils in St. Ann and a student in a
group billing situation is the right to be free from punishment in the
absence of personal fault. In addition, the defendants in St. Ann ar-
gued that suspension was not the equivalent of punishment.04 In St.
Ann the court summarily rejected both arguments. In group billing,
however, the punishment levied is compulsory restitution, which ob-
viously differs from suspensions in many respects. Unlike suspension,
restitution usually carries no stigma.1 55 In addition, suspension dis-
rupts the learning process while restitution is only ancillary to the
classroom activities. Therefore, a student may have difficulty estab-
lishing that restitution, a lesser sanction, rises to the level of punish-
ment for constitutional purposes.
Moreover, the concept of punishment plays an integral role in
the interpretation of several constitutional provisions. 156 Often the
definition of the term accepted by a court proves to be outcome de-
terminative. 157 In Bell v. Wolfish' the Supreme Court explored the
meaning of punishment in a due process analysis. Using a formula
advanced in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,'0 9 the Court in Bell re-
affirmed the factors relevant to a determination whether an action
constitutes punishment. The factors which warrant consideration are:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or re-
straint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punish-
153. Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (W.D. Mo. 1968),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1969) (sustaining expulsion for participation in mass gathering
that engaged in disruptive conduct); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d
867, 878, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 473 (1967) (affirming suspension of participants in disruptive
rally).
154. 495 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1974).
155. When governmental action threatens to damage a person's good name, reputation,
honor or integrity, a court is more apt to scrutinize the challenged conduct to insure that it
comports with minimum due process requirements. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
156. The eighth amendment proscribes cruel and unusual "punishment"; the bill of at-
tainder and ex post facto clauses prohibit "punishment" retroactively imposed by a legislature;
the fifth and sixth amendments' procedural safeguards necessitate an understanding of punish-
ment. See Comment, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Punishment, 80 COLUM. L. REv.
1667, 1667 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Comment, Definition of Punishment].
157. See e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (forfeiture of citi-
zenship held to be punishment); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924) (deportation of aliens not
punishment; therefore eighth amendment safeguards inapplicable); Miller v. Hawver, 474 F.
Supp. 441 (D. Colo. 1979) (beating of inmates by prison guards cruel but not punishment).
158. 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (recognized constitutional right not to be punished without
due process; held, however, that the challenged condition of pre-trial detainees did not consti-
tute punishment).
159. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
ment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of pun-
ishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative pur-
pose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it,
and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned. .... 160
The Bell Court condensed the factors into a general query: whether
the sanction merely serves the goals of punishment or is but an inci-
dent of some other legitimate governmental purpose.161
1. Restitution as Punishment?-Requiring students to com-
pensate the institution for damages certainly entails a deprivation;
but not every deprivation amounts to punishment. 62 The nature of
the university disciplinary system and the sanction involved in group
billing militate against a finding of punishment.
College disciplinary proceedings are not analogous to criminal
proceedings. 163 Rather, the disciplinary system is civil in nature,
16 4
and is an analogue to an administrative agency's proceeding.' 5 The
mere label "administrative" does not obviate constitutional guaran-
tees; due process protections adhere to administrative as well as judi-
cial sanctioning processes, albeit a different degree. 66 Additionally,
restitution compelled by an administrative agency is considered a
civil penalty, remedial in nature: the intent is not to punish but to
repair.
67
Educational institutions have a legitimate nonpunitive interest
160. Id. at 168-69.
161. 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979).
162. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 324 (1946) (concurring opinion) (the fact
that harm is inflicted by governmental authority does not make it punishment; figuratively
speaking, all discomforting action could be deemed punishment).
163. "By judicial mandate to impose upon the academic community in student discipline
the intricate, time consuming, sophisticated procedures rules and safeguards of criminal law
would frustrate the teaching process and render the institutional control impotent." Esteban v.
Central Missouri State College, 290 F. Supp. 622, 629 (W.D. Mo. 1968); accord Andersen v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 22 Cal. App. 3d 763, 99 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1972); Goldberg v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
164. Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228, 237 (S.D. W. Va. 1968) (sixth amendment's
guarantee of right to counsel has no application to civil disciplinary proceedings).
165. An administrative agency is a governmental authority, other than a court or legis-
lative body, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule mak-
ing. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.01 (2d ed. 1978).
166. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936); see generally K. DAvIs, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW § 13.0-.13 (2d ed. 1978).
167. The significance of the distinction between a civil penalty and a criminal penalty
lies in the proscription that administrative agencies are not empowered to determine guilt or
innocence in criminal cases. It follows that a penalty which is criminal in nature may not be
levied by an agency. The rationale is that "civil procedure is incompatible with the accepted
rules and constitutional guaranties governing the trial of criminal prosecutions." Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402 (1938); see also K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.13 (2d ed.
1978).
in recouping the cost of vandalism. State institutions have a duty to
the taxpayers to minimize costs. The institution is also charged with
an affirmative duty to eliminate the threat to students' safety and
security which vandalism poses.'6 8 To the extent that group billing
allows an institution to fulfill its obligation, restitution is incident to
a legitimate government goal.
Moreover, restitution, as compensation for damages, is not an
excessive imposition. One commentator has designated restitution
the most "humane" sanction available among disciplinary penal-
ties.'69 Also, the stature of restitution as a lesser sanction may influ-
ence the outcome of a constitutional challenge. As a practical mat-
ter, courts are seldom called upon to review university sanctions
other than expulsion. Simply put, Constitutional arguments are less
persuasive in cases involving minor sanctions.
7
1
Restitution, in light of the factors delineated in Kennedy and
Bell,'7 ' does not constitute punishment. This conclusion is fortified
by Judge Roney's dissent in St. Ann v. Palisi, 17 which criticized the
majority for relying on a criminal principle of law for their deci-
sion. '7 Judge Roney argued that the prohibition against punishment
without guilt is a tenent of criminal law; the civil law often visits
severe responsibility on individuals without regard for fault.' 4 Al-
though a few cases have used this principle in a civil context, 7 5 one
court simply refused to entertain the argument that a school policy is
inherently unreasonable by reason of sanctioning the innocent with
the guilty. 76 The judicial gloss given concepts of criminal law is in-
appropriate in the context of school disciplinary proceedings. Courts
have consistently refused this superimposition.1
77
168. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
169. Carrington, On Civilizing University Discipline, in LAW AND DISCIPLINE ON CAM-
PUs 71 (G. Holmes ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Carrington, University Discipline].
170. Comment, Private Government on Campus, supra note 47, at 1392; Perkins, Devel-
opments, supra note 17, at 1137.
171. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
172. 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1974).
173. Id. at 429.
174. Id.
175. See e.g., Kline v. Ball, 306 Pa. Super. 284, 452 A.2d 727 (1982) (refused to hold
group of school boys collectively responsible for injury to passerby resulting from boys' horse-
play because individual fault could not be ascertained); Frankel v. Cone, 214 Ga. 733, 107
S.E.2d 819 (1959) (found unconstitutional a law that held owners of automobiles strictly liable
for injuries resulting from negligent operation of their vehicles by third parties).
176. In Rose v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 679 F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 1982), parents of school
children attacked a school policy which permitted school authorities to suspend bus routes
when the vandalism and misbehavior on the busses endangered safety and security. The court
sustained the policy and rejected plaintiff's argument that the policy was inherently unfair for
punishing the innocent with the guilty: "We are not dealing here, however, with criminal pun-
ishments or with sending someone to prison without evidence." Id. at 282.
177. See supra note 163; see also Paine v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Texas, 355 F.
Supp. 199 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (holding that the Double Jeopardy clause is inapplicable to disci-
plinary proceedings which are civil in nature and designed to protect the self-contained
C. Procedural Due Process Requirements
While a student could not in all probability successfully advance
a claim based on a substantive right to be free from punishment,
restitution does entail a deprivation of property. 178 Money is "liquid
power" and the deprivation of money limits one's freedom. 17  Even
temporary restraints on the use of money are deprivations of prop-
erty that implicate procedural due process considerations.' Govern-
mental activity which infringes even minor interests, and which is
arbitrary or purposeless is unconstitutional whether or not it is
punishment.'
Furthermore, whether a rule or regulation comports with proce-
dural due process18 2 depends upon the facts and circumstances of
each case.' The touchstone of due process within university disci-
plinary systems is fair play:'84 fairness demands that rules and regu-
lations be reasonable both in fact and in application.85
Reasonableness is an elusive concept. The determination of
whether a regulation is reasonable in fact requires an utilitarian bal-
ancing process. The interest of the student affected by the regula-
tion, the institution's interest in preserving the regulation, the utility
of the regulation and degree to which the regulation meets its goal
are all factors to be weighed. 8
The student's property interest in the use and possession of
money is conceded. However, since a student's rights to continued
education, free speech, religious expression, reputation, or to other
highly valued liberties are not jeopardized by an imposition of resti-
tution, the impairment of the property interest involved in group bill-
university).
178. "Property," in its constitutional sense, is at best a vague and imprecise concept.
Tribe notes that due process requirements are implicated whenever the enforcement power of a
government is employed to deprive an individual of an interest in peaceful possession or use of
real or personal property. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 509 (1978).
179. The term "liquid power" connotes the freedom which the holder of money enjoys to
make choices. Carrington, University Discipline, supra note 169, at 89.
180. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniandach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969).
181. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 584 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Rinaldi v.
Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966).
182. Procedural due process is that aspect of due process which is concerned with the
enforcement and adjudication of rules and regulations. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 502 (1978).
183. "Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S, 471, 481 (1972), quoted in Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
184. Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228, 237 (S.D. W. Va. 1968); see supra note
164.
185. "The possibility of arbitrary action is not excluded by the existence of reasonable
regulations. There may be arbitrary application of the rule to the facts of a particular case."
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
186. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 875, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 471 (1967).
ing may carry little weight.
In contrast, Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education'87 rec-
ognized the paramount interest of educational authorities in main-
taining a campus atmosphere conducive to the educational func-
tion. 188 Efforts by administrators in pursuit of this goal are presumed
to be in good faith. 89 In addition, rules and regulations which are
necessary in maintaining order and discipline are always considered
reasonable. 90 Thus, if group billing is necessary in promoting an
educational atmosphere, it will be presumed facially reasonable de-
spite the fact that it may infringe on the outer limits of students'
constitutional rights.' 9' The institution could present a strong argu-
ment that an environment fraught with vandalism and disruptive
conduct obstructs the learning process, and thus necessitates institu-
tional intervention. Furthermore, the institution has a responsibility
to establish standards prohibiting conduct which impairs or inter-
feres with its educational function. 192 These standards may require
superior ethical and moral behavior of the students.193
Group billing is a regulation intended to promote a legitimate
university goal. Under a reasonableness test, however, the means of
achieving the end as well as the end itself must be constitutionally
defensible. 9 " The promulgation and application of group billing re-
quire procedural limitations; even a legitimate rule, arbitrarily ap-
plied, is invalid.'
At the core of procedural due process are the right to be heard
and the right to prior notice. 96 Whether the procedures used by an
institution in implementing group billing comport with the "rudi-
ments of fair play" depends upon the factual situation. Extrapolating
187. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
188. Id. at 157.
189. "And it may be noted in passing that the law indulges the presumption that school
authorities act reasonably and fairly and in good faith . . . and casts the burden on him who
calls their conduct into question to show that they have not been actuated by proper motives."
Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228, 233 (S.D. W. Va. 1968).
190. Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 729
(M.D. Ala. 1968).
191. Cf. Id. at 730.
192. The educational function of the institution and the concomitant duty has been de-
scribed as follows: "The function of the university is to impart learning and advance the
boundaries of knowledge. This carries with it the administrative responsibility to control and
regulate conduct and behavior of the students which tend to impede, obstruct or threaten the
achievements of its educational goals." Andersen v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 22 Cal. App. 3d
770, 774, 99 Cal. Rptr. 531, 535 (1972).
193. Krasnow v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univ., 414 F. Supp. 55, 56
(W.D. Va. 1976) (holding that while the subjection of a student to disciplinary proceedings for
off-campus conduct may create an irrebuttable presumption that the conduct detrimentally
affects the university, such a presumption is not constitutionally impermissible).
194. Paine v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Texas, 355 F. Supp. 199, 204 (W.D. Tex.
1972).
195. See supra note 185.
196. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 512 (1978).
from student expulsion cases, it is possible to identify minimal proce-
dural standards.
First, it is fundamental that the student have knowledge of the
group billing scheme. 19 7 Given the transitory student population, the
codification of group billing in a student handbook or residence hall
contract is the only practicable way of communicating regulations. It
serves to state behavioral expectations and sets norms for students
prior to the formation of the community. 198 Such fair warning can-
not reasonably be ignored.
Second, the enforcement procedures must be fair and relia-
ble.199 The element of control which is the nucleus of group billing,
must be considered. Thus, students should not be held responsible for
damages occurring outside the area of their control. For example,
vandalism to a building's exterior or to a facility open to the public
or unsecured cannot be justifiably attributed to resident students.
Similarly, the institution should take steps to insure that the charges
for damages accurately reflect the actual costs incurred and that the
damages being billed occurred within the occupancy period of the
students affected. Moreover, once specific procedures are established,
the institution obviously must abide by them. 0
The final requisite of due process is the provision for an oppor-
tunity to be heard.2 01 A "full dress" hearing is not necessary but
students should at least have the option of presenting their concerns
to an administrator.0 2 An "informal give and take" will, however,
probably suffice. 03
Group billing, however, should not be the institution's sole cost-
recovery mechanism. Because institutions retain the responsibility
for maintaining an atmosphere within the residence halls conducive
to academic endeavors, the duty to identify and individually disci-
pline students who disrupt the environment is non-delegable. There-
fore, while institutions may employ group billing as a secondary
means of satisfying this duty, group billing should not supplant indi-
197. Regulations governing the behavior of students should be fully and clearly pub-
lished and made available to the student body. General Order on Judicial Standards of Proce-
dures and Substance in Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education,
45 F.R.D. 133, 146 (1968).
198. Comment, Private Government on Campus, supra note 47, at 1404.
199. Reliability is a function of fairness, which is the measure of constitutionality. See
supra note 184.
200. Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 41 Ill. App. 3d 804, 354 N.E.2d 586 (1976).
But see University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 92 (1974) (rejecting theory that state
schools are bound by principles of federal administrative law requiring agencies to follow their
own regulations).
201. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961).
202. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975) (a statute which permits suspension with-
out notice or a hearing violates due process).
203. "[R]equiring effective notice and informal hearing permitting the student to give
his version of the events will provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous action." Id.
vidual fault accountability.204
VI. Group Billing: Contractually Unconscionable?
A. The Appropriateness of Applying Traditional Contract Law
To Residence Hall Contracts
The contractual nature of the relationship between students and
educational institutions has long been recognized. ° Yet, courts have
resisted the wholesale adoption of contract principles into an aca-
demic setting.20 Typically, institutions invoke the contract to en-
force rights, but avoid concurrent traditional contract law bur-
dens. 07 Also, the purported justifications for refusing to apply strict
contract analysis to universities as a whole are said to be inappropri-
ate to residence hall contracts.
The relationship of the student to the entire institution is based
on an implied contract.20 But the use of general and often informal
college publications to supply the terms of this contract 209 gives rise
to the major criticism of the contract analogy: neither the student
nor the institution typically view these documents as embodiments of
binding contracts; thus, to interpret rights and obligations on the ba-
sis of these documents violates the reasonable expectations of both
parties. 210 This argument has no force, however, with respect to resi-
dence hall contracts. Although it is variously labelled, most schools
have an express residence hall contract, often with a companion
handbook, governing the rights and duties of the respective par-
ties.2 1 ' The student is often explicitly informed that the provisions
within the agreement form a binding contract and that a signature
204. Pavella, Constitutional Issues in the Residence Halls in ADMINISTERING COLLEGE
AND UNIVERSITY HOUSING: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 32 (D. Gehring ed. 1983).
205. See e.g., Basch v. George Washington Univ., 370 A.2d 1364, 1366 (D.C. 1977);
Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 A.D.2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1962).
206. It is apparent that some elements of the law of contracts are used and
should be used in the analysis of the relationship between plaintiff and the Uni-
versity. . . . This does not mean that "contract law" must be rigidly applied in
all its aspects. . . . The student-university relationship is unique, and it should
not be and cannot be stuffed into one doctrinal category ...
Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622, 626 (10th Cir. 1975).
207. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
208. An implied contract is one that is created by law for reasons of justice and its
concomitant terms spring not from a specific or express unitary agreement but rather from the
nature of the transactions between the parties. CORBIN, I CONTRACTS § 19 (1952). A contract
that arises by operation of law necessarily allows policy to play a larger role in judicial deci-
sions. Nordin, More Workable Theory, supra note 30, at 153.
209. Comment, Wanted: A Strict Contractual Approach To The Private Universityl
Student Relationship, 68 Ky. L.J. 439, 466 (1979-80) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Strict
Contractual Approach].
210. Id.
211. Miller, Contracts and Their Use in Housing in ADMINISTERING COLLEGE AND
UNIVERSITY HOUSING: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 51 (D. Gehring ed. 1983).
signifies assent to the terms. While the amorphous contract to edu-
cate does not easily reduce to a simple commercial transaction, the
contract for housing services is easily analogized to similar landlord-
tenant agreements in the commercial world.
Some consider analogizing higher education to commercial enti-
ties offensive. 12 This criticism, however, belittles the flexibility of
contract law. Although higher education may be touched by elee-
mosynary characteristics, it is still in the "business" of educating 1 '
and the need for fiscal and managerial accountability becomes more
acute as competition among institutions for the limited number of
available consumers increases.
Students of course, are consumers of education: in return for
valuable consideration, the student receives a package of services.
However, the commercial exchange for residence hall services can be
isolated from the overall contract to educate. A student, for a speci-
fied sum, purchases housing from the institution for a period of
time.2 14 The institution, as seller, should like any other promisor be
bound by traditional contract law principles.2 1 5 The university should
not be able to escape accountability under the cloak of academic
freedom."
B. Residence Hall Contracts as Adhesion Contracts
Most residence hall agreements are standardized form con-
212. Ironically, even commentators who argue for a contractual approach resist the
analogy to "used car lots." See Nordin, More Workable Theory, supra note 30, at 164. This
resistance may stem more from the educator's own fears of being compared to used car sales-
men than from any valid legal reasoning.
213. University of Miami v. Militana, 184 S.2d 701, 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)
(even though the public has a great interest in seeing colleges supported, they are operated as
a private business).
214. "In most significant respects, the modern urban tenant is in the same position as
any other normal consumer of goods. . . . Through a residential lease, a tenant seeks to
purchase 'housing' from his landlord for a specified period of time [and] [t]he landlord 'sells'
housing. . . ." Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 627, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 711, 517 P.2d
1168, 1175 (1974); accord Seabrook v. Commuter Housing Co., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338
N.Y.S.2d 67 (1972) (pronouncing that laissez-faire has no place in the housing market).
215. One court rejected the proposition that a contract fortuitously set in an academic
context dictates special treatment:
There is no broad issue of academic freedom here. . . . [Tihe court cannot
refuse to decide whether an enforceable promise has been broken, simply be-
cause the contract is drawn between school and student. ...
In making this finding, the Court is not, as defendants contend, arbitrarily im-
posing the legal technicalities of a commercial transaction upon what is essen-
tially an academic dispute. Rather, the court is simply holding that the college,
like any other promisor, might abide by procedures to which it has bound
itself. . ..
Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 422 F. Supp. 1354, 1351, 1363 (D. R.I. 1976) rev'd 565 F.2d
200 (ist Cir. 1977). Unfortunately, the appellate court did not agree and reversed the lower
court. It is submitted that the approach of the lower court is by far the better reasoned view.
216. Id.
tracts. 17 The last several decades have evidenced a proliferation of
form contracts in the market,21 8 significantly altering the bargaining
process and the freedom of contract precept.2 1' The body of law gov-
erning adhesion contracts2 0 is an outgrowth of this phenomenon.
Although the form contract is at the core of the adhesion con-
tract doctrine, not every form contract is adhesionary.2 1 Parties to
an adhesion contract must have disparite or unequal bargaining
power.22 Typically, the predominant party offers the weaker party a
standard form contract on a take-it-or-leave it basis,22 3 thus contract
terms are non-negotiable. The resulting agreement is more akin to
private law than a mutually negotiated contract.224
In light of this description, residence hall agreements can rea-
sonably be characterized as contracts of adhesion. 22 1 First, there ex-
ists an unquestioned imbalance of power between the student and
the institution.226 Students wield little political clout, while the insti-
217. The following are typical adhesion contract characteristics of a standardized form
contract: the document is pre-printed by or on behalf of one party; the drafting party partici-
pates in numerous transactions of the type represented by the form as a matter of routine; the
form is presented to the non-drafting party with the representation that, except for perhaps a
few items, the transaction can be consumated only in the terms contained in the document; the
non-drafting party enters into few transactions of the type; the principal obligation of the non-
drafting party is usually the payment of money. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1185 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Rakoff, Contracts
of Adhesion].
218. One estimate purports that form contracts account for more than 99% of all con-
tracts now made. Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971). An adjunct to this phenomenon is the change in
consumer expectations. Most consumers will never enter into a contract other than a standard-
ized one, since they are well aware that bargaining is unavailing. Indeed, some contend bar-
gaining has ceased to be the expected, or even appropriate, behavior. See Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion, supra note 217, at 1225.
219. Freedom of contract is the inevitable counterpart of a free enterprise system. Con-
tracting is regarded as a private affair with each party free to select his bargaining partners,
and thus able to avoid oppression by shopping around. Public policy requires that individuals
enjoy liberty of contracting, and that the courts should hold the resulting contract inviolable.
In the face of this creed, courts are hesitant to intervene. Kessler, Contracts of Adhe-
sion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 630-31 (1945)
[hereinafter cited as Kessler, Freedom of Contract].
220. The term "contract of adhesion" was first coined by R. SALEILLES, DE LA DECLA-
RATION DE VALONTE 229 (1901). It was introduced into American legal vocabulary by Patter-
son, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 HARv. L. REV. 198 (1919).
221. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 485, 506 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Leff, The Emperor's New Clause].
222. K.D. v. Educational Testing Service, 87 Misc. 2d 657, 663, 386 N.Y.S.2d 747, 751
(1976) (sustaining the cancellation of plaintiff's LSAT scores pursuant to terms in an adhesion
contract).
223. Id.
224. J. CALAMERI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 341 (2d ed. 1971).
225. In Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1975), the court invalidated a
search provision in a residence hall contract as a "blanket authorization in an adhesion con-
tract," which was violative of the fourth amendment. Id. at 788.
226. As court discussed the ramifications of this imbalance:
This power in the hands of a university places an enormous responsibility
and corresponding duty on it to exercise the power fairly, consistently and with-
out arbitrariness or prejudice. . . . [S]hould this court ignore the obvious failure
tution posseses established legislative contacts and political influence
as a landowner, employer, and investor.2 7 The potential for abusive
and coercive use of this power is virtually unrestrained by market
forces.
Second, students have no opportunity to dicker over any resi-
dence hall contract terms. Nonnegotiability is reinforced by the lack
of real shopping alternatives. Most students are limited in their
choice of a college and most schools have parallel practices. Even if
residence hall rules and regulations differed markedly between
schools, shopping alternatives are not increased. Rarely is the deci-
sion of which college to attend influenced by the attributes of the
school's housing operation. In most instances, a student must be ad-
mitted to the school before housing is contemplated. If students are
not required to live on campus, they can choose between residence
halls and commercially-owned apartment units, but the latter are
often not readily available or acceptable. Also, the seasonal influx of
students often strains an already overburdened housing market. 228
Alternatives are often nonexistent, and freedom to contract trans-
mutes into freedom to adhere. 9
In sum, although the law indulges in broad generalizations with
respect to the bargaining process, 280 adhesion contracts are treated
as exceptions in order to protect weaker parties from being over-
reached.23 1 Once a contract is found to be adhesionary, the tradi-
tional generalizations cease to immunize the terms of the contract
from judicial scrutiny.28 2 Nonetheless, even an adhesion contract is
still presumptively valid. 8 The burden rests with the plaintiff, here
of the university to live up to its contractual obligations to these students, it
would be a signal to the university and other institutions that they are immune
from the same legal principles which govern other relations in our society.
Lowenthal v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. A-8525 (Ch. Ct. Tenn., Aug. 21, 1977), cited in Nordin,
More Workable Theory, supra note 30, at 145.
227. Perkins, Developments, supra note 17, at 1156.
228. "The housing crisis has not escaped national attention. Congress in 1949 expressed
its concern over the lack of adequate housing, and an inadequate housing supply is still a
serious national problem." Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 477,
329 A.2d 812, 825 (1974) (holding that Pennsylvania's Consumer Protection Act applies to
the rental of residential housing).
229. Comment, Private Government on Campus, supra note 47, at 1390.
230. These generalizations derive from the "freedom of contract" doctrine and are ex-
pressed in the following propositions:
(a) one's signature on a contract signifies assent;
(b) it is legally irrelevant whether the assentee ever actually read or understood
the contents of the contract;
(c) the assent covers all terms of the contract:
(d) in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the assentee can establish an
excuse from being held to the contract only by showing affirmative participation
by the drafter in causing the misunderstanding.
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 217, at 1185.
231. Leff, The Emperor's New Clause, supra note 221, at 508.
232. Id.
233. Contracts of adhesion are prima facie enforceable. Rakoff argues that they should
the student, to establish that the contract, in whole or in part, should
not be enforced.
C. Lefkowitz v. Bell Fior Hotel
The one reported challenge to a group billing provision compa-
rable to similar provisions in use at most colleges occurred in Lefko-
witz v. Bell Fior Hotel.23 4 In Le/kowitz, the Attorney General for
New York instituted proceedings to permanently enjoin the defen-
dant hotel from transacting business in a fraudulent and illegal
manner.
The hotel had entered into separate agreements with 280 stu-
dents from Sullivan County Community College to provide housing
and meals for one semester.2 35 The severe housing shortage in the
area was the main impetus for the agreement.23 6 Each student was
required to execute a "Resident Hotel Agreement," and to deposit
fifty dollars towards a damage fund. Clause V(6) of the agreement
provided:
In the event that it cannot be determined who caused or
was responsible for the damage to the Hotel property, then a
reasonable cost of repair of the damage will be deducted from
the deposit fund referred to in 111(a). If the damage exceeds the
individual damage deposit fund and the person(s) who cause the
damage can not be ascertained, or are not financially responsi-
ble, then the damage may be deducted from the Group Deposit
fund.
23 7
At the end of the semester, the hotel notified the students that there
would be no refund as the cost of damages suffered by the hotel had
completely depleted the fund. 36
The state asserted that the damage fund clause was unconscion-
able and void as a matter of law. In defense, the hotel argued that
first, it is general knowledge that housing large numbers of students
is dangerous, and second, the students had assented to the group bill-
ing by signing the agreement." 9 The trial court rejected both argu-
ments as irrelevant to the question of unconscionability.
In determining unconscionability, the court adopted the crite-
be treated as presumptively unenforceable. See Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesions, supra note
221, at 1174.
234. 95 Misc. 2d 901, 408 N.Y.S.2d 696 (Special Term, 1978), rev'd 74 A.D.2d 692,
425 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1980).
235. 95 Misc. 2d 901, 408 N.Y.S.2d 696, 698 (1978).
236. Id. at 903, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
237. Id. at 902, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
238. The damages included the "cost of repainting hallways, rooms, stairwells, hand-
rails, the dining room ceiling, and the cost of repair for broken heat thermostat registers and
broken windows and doors." Id.
239. Id.
rion established in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.240 : "It
has been held that the unequal bargaining powers and the absence of
a meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties, together with
contract terms which so unreasonably favor the other party, may
spell out unconscionability." 2 4 Finding each of the above considera-
tions present, the court in Lefkowitz held clause V(6) unconsciona-
ble on its face. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment
for the plaintiff.
2 42
The appellate court, however, reversed, finding the contract not
to have so unreasonably favored the hotel as to merit summary judg-
ment on the unconscionability issue. 4 The case was remanded for
further factual inquiry into the relative bargaining positions of the
parties.
D. Beyond Lefkowitz
Lefkowitz may not definitively resolve the conscionability of
group billing, however, the courts' reasoning is instructive. The lower
court identified four factors which influenced its holding: first, it
found deficient procedures by which the damage assessment was
conducted.244 The hotel had failed to make a pre-occupancy inspec-
tion of the common areas for which students were to be billed. There
was thus no way to determine if the damages had occurred prior to
the actual occupancy of the students. The court's concern was valid;
institutions unable to document the pre-occupancy condition of their
facilities may be found to have been unreasonable or unfair.
Second, the court felt that group billing absolved the hotel from
making any efforts to identify the individual vandals.24 Since the
hotel would be compensated by the damage fund, there was no in-
centive for management to investigate any specific incidents of
vandalism.
This disincentive effect of group billing is equally pertinent to
the university setting. The institution may be able to legitimately
expect students to share in the responsibility for maintaining the res-
idence halls, but the ultimate duty to enforce rules and control stu-
240. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. 1965).
241. 95 Misc. 2d 901, 903, 408 N.Y.S.2d 696, 698 (1978).
242. Id. at 906, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 700. The court also found the clause to fall within the
purview of article § 63(12) of the Executive Law of New York, which prohibits the conducting
of business in a persistently fraudulent and illegal manner. The hotel was enjoined from engag-
ing in further such acts, and was directed to restore the deposits to the students. Id. at 905,
906, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 699, 700.
243. 74 A.D.2d 692 at 694, 425 N.Y.S.2d 659 at 661. The Appellate Division also held
that the transactions between the hotel and the students did not constitute "repeated fraudu-
lent acts" within the meaning of the Executive Law, which was designed to protect consumers
victimized by continuing acts of fraud or illegality. Id. at 694, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
244. 95 Misc. 2d at 904, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
245. Id.
dent's behavior rests with the institution." 6 It is in the best interests
of the school to be able to demonstrate that all reasonable means
have been taken to satisfy this responsibility.
The third and fourth factors concern the perceived "unfairness"
of holding innocent students responsible for others' misconduct and
for the debts of judgment-proof students. 4 7 While the appellate
court did not agree that group billing was inherently unfair,248 it ap-
pears that an institution will have to overcome the semblance of un-
fairness surrounding group billing.
The appellate court also insisted that there be an inquiry into
the actual bargaining powers and shopping alternatives of the stu-
dents. Within the context of the university, the student has no bar-
gaining power.2 49 The shopping alternatives may be nonexistent in
the case of schools that require students to live on campus, or limited
depending upon the off-campus market.2 50 Any alternatives must be
reasonable. A choice of accommodations may be rendered meaning-
less if the benefits of living on campus clearly outweigh the off-cam-
pus option. Courts which find an absence of meaningful choice may
tend to more carefully scrutinize the procedure and its application.
E. Unconscionability Generally
Group billing is often regarded as unfair. Unfairness or onesid-
edness, without more, however, is not the equivalent of unconsciona-
bility.2 1 Additionally, the doctrine has often been applied surrepti-
tiously. 15 2 Finally, both the Restatement (Second) of Contracts25'
and the Uniform Commercial Code2 54 contain provisions dealing
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. "Moreover, we also conclude that Special Term erred in granting summary relief
on the ground of unconscionability. . . . In our view, the terms of the contract do not so
unreasonably favor respondent so as to be unconscionable on their face without a factual in-
quiry into the relative bargaining positions of the parties." 74 A.D.2d 692, 693, 425 N.Y.S.2d
659, 661 (1980).
249. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
251. Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931, 943
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Spanogle, Unconscionability].
252. See, e.g., Albert Merrill School v. Godey, 78 Misc. 2d 647, 648, 357 N.Y.S.2d 378,
380 (1947).
253. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 provides:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is con-
tract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
254. Unconscionable Contract or Clause.
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any un-
conscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
with unconscionable contracts. Despite this wide utilization of the
term, attempts to rigidly define the concept have generally failed. 50
Case law analysis does, however, provide a conceptual framework.
This framework focuses on two aspects of unconscionability:
procedural, relating to contract formation; and substantive, relating
to contract terms.2 56 An unconscionability claim usually requires
both aspects to be present. 7
"Unfair surprise" and "oppression" are the two varieties of pro-
cedural unconscionability 58 Unfair surprise characterizes abuses of
the nondrafting party which stems from unknown terms. 59 Oppres-
sion connotes unequal bargaining power and the absence of meaning-
ful choices. The adhesion contract nature of residence hall contracts
are procedurally oppressive, yet oppression alone is not sufficient;
group billing, as a contract term, must also be manifestly unreasona-
ble before the term is pronounced unconscionable. 60
One commentator posits that this concept of manifest unreason-
ableness represents a balancing of interests.2 1 If the implementation
procedures avoid the pitfalls identified in Lefkowitz 2 62 and are gener-
ally fair, the balance tips in favor of the institution. No readily iden-
tifiable public policy, aside from a concern for fairness, would seem
to weigh heavily on the student's side. To the contrary, the public's
interest in educating students to be responsible citizens and in al-
lowing academic institutions flexibility in accomplishing its goals
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect
to aid the court in making the determination.
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977).
255. Reduction of the elements of unconscionability to a black-letter rule is virtually
impossible: "Who knows what is 'unconscionable'? How do you measure the length of the
chancellor's foot?" 47 ALI PROCEEDINGS 507 (1970), quoted in Murray, Standardized Agree-
ment Phenomena, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 775 (1982).
256. These two elements of unconscionability were first recognized in Leff, Emperor's
New Clause, supra note 221. Spanogle further developed the construct in his analysis; see
Spanogle, Unconscionability, supra note 251.
257. Spanogle, Unconscionability, supra note 251, at 932.
258. Id. at 943.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 944. The quasi-public nature of higher education presents a strong argument
in favor of a finding of form-contract oppression. See David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 55 Misc. 2d 1080, 287 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1968) (declaring that a bank is affected with a
public interest, and therefore subject to public regulation).
261. The court must weigh the legitimate interests of the drafting party against
identifiable public policies that the terms may contravene. Manifestly unreasona-
ble terms range through a continuum from those whose paramount defect is lack
of support by legitimate interests of the drafting party ('commercially unjusti-
fied'), to those whose defect is that they are contrary to a public interest recog-
nized by the courts ('void as against public policy'). Between these two poles
there is an infinite number of permutations containing various degrees of both
types of defects.
Spanogle, Unconscionability, supra note 251, at 958.
262. See supra notes 234-48 and accompanying text.
bolster the institution's case.
In Lefkowitz, the defendant was a commercially owned and op-
erated hotel. The court did not have to wrestle with the constraints
of academic abstention which a university defendant would pose. An
unconscionability determination demands a regard to the nature and
background of the drafting party's enterprise,2 63 and given the defer-
ence accorded institutional rulemaking, it is likely that a carefully
planned and executed group billing practice would be sustained.
VII. Summary and Recommendations
The manner in which group billing is implemented appears to
be the area most susceptible to challenge. It is possible to identify a
number of procedural checkpoints which an institution should con-
sider when reviewing its group billing practice. The following list
does not purport to be exhaustive:
A. Goals
An institution which regards group billing as both a behavioral
management tool and a means of financial recoupment may find it-
self on firmer grounds to withstand attack.264
B. Student Involvement
Administrators should strive to involve students in the develop-
ment and implementation of a group billing practice.6 Students
who are involved in the forming of community standards are more
apt to internalize the norm created.288 In addition, utilizing students
in liaison roles allows student staff members to divorce themselves
from the negativism which usually ensues from group billing.
C. Notice
The residence hall contract or handbook26 should prominently
delineate group billing policies. The institution should ensure that
students understand the policy and its goals and how it will affect
them.
263. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(terms of contract are to be considered in light of the general commercial background and
commercial needs of particular enterprise or case in determining whether contract was fair or
reasonable).
264. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
265. By allowing students to assume increased responsibility in environmental manage-
ment processes, a more mature, self-disciplined residential environment will result. Slepitza,
Coping With Student Behavior Problems, supra note 65. See also Chickering, College Resi-
dences and Student Development, 48 EDUc. REc. 179 (1967).
266. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text. But see Grossner v. Trustees of
Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
D. Procedures
The institution should detail standard operating procedures
prior to implementation of a group billing policy. Once procedures
are established, the institution should not deviate significantly from
the procedures promulgated.
In defining areas of financial responsibility, the student must at
least be able to exercise an element of "control" over the area. 69
The more confined the area of responsibility is, the better the chance
that the whole policy will be considered fair or reasonable.
E. Inspections and Billings
Pre-occupancy inspections are indispensible 7 ° Students should
not be billed for "wear and tear." Inspections and billings should
occur on a regular basis. After each inspection, the area's damages
and costs should be posted for the students' information.2 7 1 Prior to
actual billing, students should have an opportunity to take individual
responsibility for an item or to provide the staff with other pertinent
information.
F. Appeal Process
There is no need to provide any formal adversarial appeal pro-
cess. An informal opportunity to discuss concerns should suffice.272
Some procedure for adjustments for technical errors and allowances
for extended absences or other extenuating circumstances meriting
adjustments may be advisable. The process for appeal and accept-
able excuses should be communicated to the students at the begin-
ning of the term.
G. University's Responsibilities
The institution should be prepared to make and substantiate
ongoing efforts to identify and hold responsible individual wrongdo-
ers. a27  In order to enable students to exercise the necessary "con-
trol", the institution must maintain adequate security on campus,
and in the residence halls specifically. 74 It would obviously be un-
reasonable to hold students accountable for damages caused by tres-
passers in areas where students have surrendered the security of the
268. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
271. Often students are ill-informed about the costs involved in repairing damaged facil-
ities. Posting the bills can act as a norming tool. See supra note 198.
272. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
building to the institution. The transaction costs in developing a
sound and fair group billing process can therefore be high. Institu-
tions with minimal vandalism costs and few behavioral problems in
the residence halls may decide that the risk of problems of group
billing outweigh any potential benefits.
VIII. Conclusion
Courts have displayed an increased willingness to review educa-
tional institutions' disciplinary rules and regulations. However, the
doctrine of academic abstention continues to temper the scope of this
review. The power to promulgate and implement rules inheres in the
nature of the educational institution. But, rules must be reasonable
in substance and in application, and be designed to enhance the edu-
cational mission of the institution.
A group billing regulation can be an effective tool in curbing
vandalism and misconduct in residence halls. Institutions have a le-
gitimate nonpunitive interest in implementing group billing in order
to facilitate or maintain an academic environment. The ultimate va-
lidity of the practice, however, will most likely turn on the imple-
mentation procedures an institution adopts. Fair and reasonable pro-
cedures will withstand scrutiny even though they may impinge upon
the outer limits of students' constitutional rights.
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